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THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE: THE ENGINEER CONTRIBUTION

BY

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THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE:
THE ENGINEER CONTRIBUTION

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

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Military assistance, Nation building.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Significant contributions to Third World development have been undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the form of nation building. The objective of any nation building program must be to stimulate positive change in support of U.S. national security interests by promoting growth and stability in evolving countries. Modernization and development in these countries can be a stabilizing factor when properly applied. Nation building provides a tool that can demonstrate political resolve while favorably influencing our security interests. Using the Corps in this role clearly demonstrates the viability of an Army force possessing strategic utility without being deployed as an expeditionary force. Today, nation building is a concept that provides the regional CINC's with the means to simultaneously protect U.S. vital interests, maintain U.S. national security interests, foster joint and combined military objectives, gain access and influence in developing nations to protect or further our regional vital interests. Exactly how and to what extent nation building is conducted in any given location is open to debate.

The use of the military in the establishment of this nation's early transportation and water resource systems greatly accelerated our development and growth as a global power in a relatively short period of time. Historically, we have exported this expertise to open sea lanes, construct road networks in developing countries, build all types of facilities to open markets, provide access to raw materials, and provide technical knowledge to a myriad of problems associated with growth and expansion.

This study addresses:

-The principle benefits of a nation building program.
-The pitfalls encountered in previous nation building endeavors.
-The challenges confronting a program of nation building.
-The conditions required for the successful application of a nation building program.

Furthermore, the study concludes with a concept that enhances the probability of initial and sustained support by both the U.S. public and the host nation for low cost, viable assistance that produces mutually beneficial results.

A strategic force in peacetime must sustain its combat power as a deterrent. Nation building provides the Army, in general, and more specifically the Corps of Engineers with a tool to maintain combat power in peacetime manifested by access and

influence in order to be properly postured for crisis. The benefits to the Army are the potential for lasting presence and durability over the long haul while developing a diversity of capabilities tailored to future needs.

Nation building involves the indirect use of military forces in a political arena. In this role, the military is supporting the political interests and goals of the United States in the region. In short, politics assumes the dominate role.

Nation building activities by the CINC's can be tailored to the host nation's legitimate needs and desires in order to establish a frame of reference that is sufficiently specific to allow other government and non-government agencies and activities the opportunity to provide proactive developmental assistance. Assistance or nation building forces are tailored to meet the needs of the host country while maximizing the potential of the host to contribute to U.S. interests.

A commitment to a nation building program demonstrates credibility and resourcefulness by taking prudent risks and exerting low cost efforts early on. The expectation is that a cumulative effect will be realized by improved economic growth, stability, adherence to Western ideals, access to markets and natural resources, and access to critical facilities and lines of communications.

For the Corps of Engineers, nation building offers the opportunity to conduct meaningful activities within each CINC's area of responsibility and to become integrated into the strategic fiber of the Army and ultimately our nation. Resources must be provided on a global priorities scheme based on the potential contribution of the host nation to U.S. national interests. The varying interests and capabilities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense must be arbitrated at the national level to provide the requisite unity and continuity of effort.

In a nation building program the U.S. Army can demonstrate its strategic resolve in a peacetime environment while sustaining the combat readiness of its force. As tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. become more relaxed, nation building becomes the frontier of strategic opportunity. Nation building can enhance our global influence, promote our military preparedness, and protect our strategic interests by developing alliances and coalitions in the "Third World".

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the potential for confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has dominated world affairs. The struggle between capitalism and communism, between freedom and dictatorship, and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has provided the United States with a justifiably valid strategy based on containment. Recently, the Soviet Union has publicly declared that the recovery from severe economic strife, perpetuated by the Leninist/Marxist "experiment", is the first priority in their national strategy. This pronouncement of peace and goodwill must be closely scrutinized and evaluated in light of the fact that the Soviet's objective for world communism has not changed. If Mr. Gorbachev is earnest, and if he is able to lead the Soviet Union to a militarily defensive state, focused on internal economy and the improvement of Soviet citizens' quality of life, then the United States must be prepared to manage a change in our national strategy. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can assist our nation in this change.

Clearly, the area that presents the greatest potential for

improved global peace is the stabilization of the Third World. Economic, political, sociopsychological and military instruments of power can be brought to bear on this problem, but with a reduced threat from our principal adversary, how do we continue to justify immense expenditures on our military forces? If military funding is reduced to compensate for a balanced budget or for reducing the deficit, how can we maintain the readiness of our engineer units and the Corps of Engineers?

The authors of this paper propose a solution to the neglect we have rendered Third World nations since our Vietnam experience, while providing a viable option to the Corps of Engineers to stay prepared for war. Our proposal is that the Corps of Engineers should be given the mission of supporting the regional CINC's and Ambassadors with engineering support and services. This support should facilitate growth and development in the Third World countries qualified for our help and assistance. The term used to describe this in the past has been "nation building". Nation building, in general, may be defined as any education, medical, engineering, or humanitarian assistance provided a foreign nation that materially contributes to that country's ability to grow and develop itself. For the purposes of this paper we will focus on the engineer contribution to nation building, although it must be understood that in any such program, multiple areas of assistance should be incorporated and conducted simultaneously.

In this presentation, we will address the benefits of a comprehensive nation building program; some historical examples; pitfalls; challenges confronting the implementation of such a program; principles for a successful nation building program; how an effective organization for nation building might be formed; and finally the engineer contribution to the nation building program.

If peace is truly breaking out all over, the time for the United States to look at developmental programs which will perpetrate democracy in the underdeveloped countries of the world, while stabilizing potential areas of conflict, is upon us. The opportunities such a program has for enhancing our national security are truly exciting and provide any number of challenges for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as a strategic force.

CHAPTER 2

NATION BUILDING: THE BACKGROUND

Since the end of the Second World War, our government has recognized that various forms of foreign aid are indispensable tools in protecting U.S. vital interests abroad, providing humanitarian aid and promoting democracy in developing countries. These efforts have been invaluable in insuring peace and stability throughout the world. An integral part and historically successful means of delivering aid and assistance to our allies in the developing Third World has been through nation building. Nation building can take many forms, but the true advantage of this type of aid and assistance is that the grantor has some control over how and to whom aid funds are distributed within a country.(1) While humanitarian/developmental assistance may be more acceptable and supportable by domestic public opinion, security assistance provides a viable tool to protect our strategic vital interests.

To protect U.S. interests in the Third World a strategy of security assistance must be adopted that not only provides stability to the developing nation's government, but materially


benefits the public while opening other avenues of development. Programs of this nature diminish public unrest and inculcate a feeling of developmental pride in the society, thereby diminishing the potential for violence or disorder. In the past 40 years all the conflicts in which the United States has been involved have occurred in the Third World.(2) These conflicts tend to be less threatening than an all out war with the Soviet Union, but they can and have undermined our ability to defend our global, vital interests.(3) The concept of nation building holds some unique opportunities to infuse developing countries with economic and military assistance, while stabilizing the political situation within the country. Inherent in any security assistance program is the obligation for humanitarian or developmental assistance.

The foreign aid programs which assist our allies in reducing the underlying causes of instability have proven to be inflexible and inadequate. Clearly, these programs require an increase in funding and a relaxation of current restrictive legislation. Congress consistently has underfunded requests for assistance and has earmarked 86% of the annual security assistance budget to 5 countries.(4)

The Foreign Aid Program is divided into international security assistance and humanitarian assistance. Both programs are the responsibility of the State Department. Historically, the State Department has used the Department of Defense to

administer the security assistance program. The use of the U.S. military for nation building has been the province of international security assistance; however, much of this aid could be considered as developmental and humanitarian in nature.

Nation building has been undertaken by various nations throughout history and the actual form of this aid has varied widely. Military forces have a variety of resources that can be effectively utilized during periods of peace to aid and assist developing countries.



The primary purpose for the Security Assistance Program is to strengthen our allies in areas where the United States has special security concerns. These programs make it possible for our allies to strengthen their economies and to acquire and use

U.S. military equipment necessary for their own defense.(5)

Security assistance is not a philanthropic endeavor, operating to the detriment of domestic programs and priorities.(6) It produces domestic benefits in terms of employment, export sales, investment opportunities, and access to raw materials in addition to being an investment in our national security and the well being of the United States.(7) The point at which we normally become involved in a developing country's domestic instability is on the eve of an eminent conflict. Nation building gives the opportunity to enter and affect change before insurgent forces can gain significant popularity to generate instability.

A recently developed additive to the security assistance program is the deployment for training of engineer and medical units in Central America, to perform projects in support of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command. The principle mission of this program is to provide training opportunities for engineer and medical soldiers, while supporting U.S. vital interests in the area. Many of these projects are humanitarian or developmental in nature. Materials are often provided by the host nation while the labor and equipment is provided by the deployed U.S. forces. The program has proven to be beneficial for both U.S. forces and the host nation; however, current legislation has precluded the utility of this endeavor from being fully realized. Engineer units receive valuable training while

producing usable facilities for the host nation. The very presence of U.S. personnel in the area demonstrates commitment to the local populace and other countries in the region. Funding for this endeavor is provided by the Department of the Army for training purposes. With a shrinking defense dollar and the proportionate dwindling of training funds, the amount of effort that is affordable and feasible will have to be closely scrutinized in the future.


The implementation of foreign assistance and aid in the form of nation building is a deeply involved and complex matter. The number of agencies and people involved in determining how much assistance is required; which countries should be provided the assistance; and when should the assistance be made available is very large and cumbersome. Not only is coordination necessary at the U.S. intra-departmental level, but this process bridges the gap between departments and ultimately between the legislative and executive branches of government.

Historically, the process of nation building has involved many players from diverse organizations. The first group of players in the process is the Congress. Each year the Congress reviews the fiscal budget as submitted by the President, modifies the proposed budget, and approves the budget for execution. Operating on a single year fiscal budget has led to inconsistencies and a lack of uniformity of effort in our foreign aid programs from one fiscal year to the next, and left the false

perception with recipients that the United States has changed its focus and priority toward their nation.

Our funding for foreign aid has been steadily decreasing over the past decade, however, as our strategy changes to accommodate "glasnost" and "perestroika", our involvement in the Third World should increase.

Much of the U.S. effort in the Third World has been provided to nations in conflict or on the verge of conflict. A void in the funding program has been for humanitarian and developmental assistance as a preventive measure. A lower degree of effort is required to stimulate growth when a nation is at peace.



The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1970 provide the basis for military involvement in the foreign security assistance program. The federal government's budget for fiscal year 1989 provides for a total budget authority of \$16.2 billion for conducting international relations. This includes budget authority of \$8.9 billion for international security assistance and \$4.7 billion for international development and humanitarian assistance with the remainder being utilized for the conduct of international affairs.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 appoints the Secretary of State as the responsible agent for both security assistance and humanitarian/developmental assistance. Normally, the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology or the Deputy Secretary of State is the executive agent for all matters of international aid.(8)

In support of the Department of State, the Department of Defense provides the majority of equipment and services for the security assistance portion of the program. The Department of Defense is then compensated or reimbursed for the services rendered from the funds designated for International Affairs. Established under DOD directives 5105.38 and 5132.3 security assistance programs are administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs and Plans. He is the DOD

focal point for all security assistance and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for formulating policy as well as the execution of programs under the guidance and in cooperation with the State Department.(9) The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is supported by the Defense Security Assistance Agency(DSAA). The Director of the DSAA coordinates with the State Department and works directly for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.(10) The Army proponent for security assistance is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The Ambassador in any given country is responsible for any assistance programs in that country. The Ambassador has at his disposal personnel from the Agency for International Development(AID), Peace Corps and the Security Assistance Organization(SAO) or Military Assistance Advisory Group(MAAG). By law, the size of a SAO cannot exceed 6 personnel regardless of the complexity or scope of the assistance being provided. AID and Peace Corps personnel are primarily concerned with humanitarian and developmental assistance. The SAO works with the Ambassador but is evaluated by the regional unified command Commander-in-Chief(CINC). Personnel needed for training assistance of a host nation military element are provided by the CINC on an as needed basis. Normally these training teams are drawn from an ad hoc group of professional military personnel formed from different units and locations. This informal approach to providing assistance seldom produces a homogenous team, fully capable of meeting the requirements.


The involvement and interest of the regional unified command CINC has been steadily increasing over the past few years. This is particularly evident in Central America. The use of engineer units on projects that enhance the security assistance program, while advancing the development of the host nation, has provided tangible benefits to the CINC and the Ambassador while improving the stability of the host governments.

A new player in this process is the Low Intensity Conflict Board of the National Security Council. The board is Cabinet level, created to oversee readiness for low intensity conflict within the U.S. military.(11) Still in its formulation stage, it is anticipated that this organization could act as the catalyst for the formulation of a nation building program in the future and bridge the gap between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

The final player in the nation building process is the military construction agency. Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Navy Civil Engineer Corps have supported the regional CINC's in nation building programs around the world. Although this paper will address the use of the Corps of Engineers, the same procedures would hold true for areas in which the Navy maintains responsibility for construction.

Public support for a program is absolutely necessary to

start and sustain a program. The key spokesman for generating this support has been and should be the President. Over the last 40 years, our national objective of promoting democracy, human rights, relief from human suffering and strengthened relationship with Third World countries has not changed. Similarly, our national security objectives with respect to the Third World has remained constant. What has changed, between administrations, has been the manner with which developmental assistance programs have been presented to the American people. Those programs that have enjoyed the broadest, sustained public support have tended to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the program as opposed to the national security aspects.



The Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift were presented and conducted as humanitarian programs. Each, in its own way, was successful from a humanitarian point of view. Each was also successful from a military, national security point of view. President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" focused on humanitarian objectives in Latin America. The Alliance for Progress achieved mixed results in the different Latin American countries, but it had strong U.S. public support until it was overshadowed by the Vietnam War.

On the other hand, U.S. sponsored developmental assistance programs founded on military and national security objectives have generally not enjoyed strong and sustained public and international support. The Truman Doctrine, a security assistance program focused on Turkey and Greece, has enjoyed marginal public support since its inception in 1947. It has served our national security objectives and promoted development in both countries over the long term, but how might the two countries have looked today had the Truman Plan had a humanitarian focus? Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua under Somoza, and more recently El Salvador have made the American public skeptical of the value of developmental assistance focused on national security vice humanitarian objectives.

There are many examples of U.S. developmental assistance, specifically medical and construction support, as part of

counterinsurgency security assistance in, Vietnam, Laos, and El Salvador. While each of these programs served to relieve human suffering and improved U.S. relations with the indigenous people, they produced limited overall national development, because of the recipient government's preoccupation with combating an insurgency.

Over the last forty years there has been a continuing debate over the feasibility of promoting growth in Third World countries. In a 1961 article, John Kenneth Gailbraith identified four conditions that must exist in a country before foreign aid in the form of capital can be successfully applied. These four conditions are:

1. A substantial degree of literacy and that smaller number of people with higher education and skills necessary to man a government and undertake the managerial and technical tasks associated directly or indirectly with economic advance....
2. A substantial measure of social justice. If the ordinary individual receives no share of the advance, he will make no willing contribution to it....
3. A reliable apparatus of government and public administration. Clearly, economic development can occur only in a context of law and order, where persons and property are reasonably secure....
4. A clear and purposeful view of what development involves. Development will not occur if it is believed to come automatically with escape from colonialism; if it is identified as a matter of course with faith in free enterprise or socialism; if it is regarded as the special magic that will be provided by a particular political personality; or if it is to be accomplished by some single stroke of genius such as the building of a particular road, the settling of a particular jungle, or the watering of a particular desert.(12)

He further makes the point that for a developmental

assistance program to be successful, all the above conditions must be met, and that most countries requiring aid are lacking one or more of these factors.(13) Any developmental/humanitarian assistance program must address each of these factors.

In 1962, Hans Morgenthau raised the point that, while western economic development has been characterized by "the formation of capital and the accumulation of technical knowledge", applying money and technology in an underdeveloped country does not guarantee economic development.(14) He pointed out that some countries "suffer from deficiencies, some natural and insuperable, others social and remediable, which no amount of capital and technological know-how supplied from the outside can cure."(15)

1. The poverty of natural resource may be such as to make economic development impossible.... Many of the countries which are the perennial recipients of subsistence aid are likely to fall in...this...category.

2. A nation may also suffer from human deficiencies which preclude economic development. As there are individuals whose qualities of character and level of intelligence make it impossible for them to take advantage of economic opportunities, so are there nations similarly handicapped....

3. Other Nations are presently deficient in the specific qualities of character and intelligence that go into the making of a modern economic system, even though their general or inherent capabilities qualify them potentially for the necessary transformation in the future....

4. A civilization, such as the Burmese, which deprecates success in this world because it stands in the way of success in the other world, puts a cultural obstacle in the path of industrial development, which foreign aid by itself cannot overcome....(16)

On the surface, Morgenthau's view tends to look rather elitist, however, it can be safely stated that where the conditions he cites exist, developmental assistance will be more challenging and time consuming.

Past U.S. attempts at nation building have produced mixed results. The players have been numerous and the processes complex. Public, academic, and official opinion has been and is mixed on the necessity, feasibility and process for nation building. With a changing world situation, the time to reassess nation building as an instrument of power is upon us.

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CHAPTER 3

NATION BUILDING PITFALLS

Nation building is an enterprise that must be thoroughly planned and organized to diminish the potential for failure. The first source of failure may be the formulation of the national objectives from our general national interests for a particular country or region. If we assume that our national objectives have been flawlessly distilled, failure may be rooted in our planning and organization for nation building. We may have a good plan and be improperly organized, or conversely, have a good organization and a faulty plan. Success rests on the manner in which a program is executed, both within the U.S. and within the target country. Critical to success at the national objective level, the planning and organizing level, and particularly at the execution level is our attitude toward nation building and the host country's people. The remainder of the chapter will discuss some potential nation building pitfalls that for the most part are rooted in basic attitudes.

The host government may, early in the program, exceed its technical and managerial capacity to handle a development

program. Technical assistance from the U.S. will help to bridge this gap, but ultimately this problem must be remedied by, first, on the job training and ultimately, formal training and education.

Assuming the government does represent the people, one of its most difficult tasks will be to convince "elite" citizens that reform is necessary. Morgenthau makes a further point that highlights one of the most common impediments to a developmental assistance program: The ruling groups in an underdeveloped society tend to derive their political power from the "economic status quo". The ownership of arable land in most underdeveloped countries is the primary source of political power. "To ask them to use foreign aid for...the purpose of changing the status quo...is to require a readiness for self-sacrifice and a sense of social responsibility which few ruling groups have shown throughout history."(1) The implementation of land reform, the breaking of the status quo, has often led to more social and political problems than existed prior to the change. He states that "foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, either voluntarily induced from within or brought about through pressure." Providing foreign aid "with strings" has the drawback of "generating suspicions and nationalistic resentments to be exploited both by the defenders of the status quo and the promoters of Communistic revolution."(2) For developmental assistance to have a lasting effect, it must include strings that will promote a change of the status quo. This change must be


gradual enough to be absorbed without creating anarchy in the country, and finally, the program must be designed for a specific country.

Other devastating side affects that may result from a developmental assistance program are growth in the national debt and high rates of inflation, fueled by an increased economic tempo. Most Third World countries are now severely strapped by debts incurred from rapid development programs. Latin American countries who were recipients of the "Alliance for Progress" support through the 1960's experienced rapid growth, accelerated by loans through the 1970's, and are now in dire economic straits due to the economic recession of the 1980's. In fact, the principal export of many Latin American nations is now currency to the world's financial powers; and they find themselves hard pressed to service even the interest on their loans. This third order affect of the "Alliance for Progress" resembles what colonization must have looked like to many Latin American countries; only now they have the added burden of rapid population growth and urbanization to deal with.(3) Any new developmental assistance program is going to have to address a country's existing debt, first, and then be designed to limit further debt growth. One of the most pressing Latin American issues facing the new U.S. administration is how to handle their debt problem.(4)

Another second order effect of the rapid economic growth of most Latin American countries since the early 1960's has been rapid urbanization, accompanied by a rapid population growth. The major cities of Central and South America have grown much faster than the governments could expand basic infrastructures, such as streets, water and sewer systems, transportation and housing. Most U.S. experience at nation building has been in predominately rural nations or at least in rural areas of the nation. There is a dearth of literature on foreign assistance directed at urban problems. Future nation building efforts will have to address this growing problem as well as the more traditional rural development.

Two potential problems that could develop from the people's standpoint, as a result of a developmental assistance program, center around expectations and acceptance of change. If the program is oversold, expectations may start too high. Unfulfilled expectations produce frustration and resentment which may create apathy or unrest. Development produces change. How that change is accepted by the people is critical to the success of the program. Acceptance and second and third order results of the change, brought about by a program are difficult to predict. For this reason, it is important to have a comprehensive, integrated plan focused on stated objectives and to start the plan slowly, continuously analyzing the results achieved.

So far, we have only looked at the potential benefits to the country's government and people. A developmental assistance program not properly formulated and managed, can produce equally damaging results. If there is a potential toward corruption in the government, military or national elite, more economic resources at their disposal may increase corruption in the country, thus defeating the real purpose and intent of the program. Along with human rights violations by the government, corruption in the host nation's administration of a program will quickly endanger continued U.S. support.



There are costs associated with even a modest program. Our current national deficit and the ongoing debate for domestic versus defense spending will challenge any administration to justify increased Third World developmental assistance spending. Furthermore, development of Third World countries is a slow process that requires a long term commitment; a commitment that

will surely transcend administrations and more likely generations in the United States.

Even given a long term commitment for resources, Third World development is a complicated undertaking, fraught with controversy, frustrations, unexpected developments, and occasional setbacks or reversals. Conducting an effective long term nation building program is going to take national commitment to start and national character to sustain.

Third World developmental assistance programs must be worked through the host government in power. Providing a Third World country developmental assistance places our government in the position of being responsible for actions taken by the host government in the eyes of the host country public, the international community and our own public.

Hans Morgenthau wrote that it is important to recognize the "diversity of policies" that go by the title of foreign aid. He stated that there are six distinct types of foreign aid, each with its own policy set: "humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development." (5) He makes the observation that only humanitarian aid is "per se" nonpolitical, and if given in a political context, even it is political.

Since each category of foreign aid, as categorized by Morgenthau, with the possible exception of humanitarian aid, is political, each also has "strings attached." The attitude with which this aid with "strings attached" is rendered then is critical to a program's success. Averel Harriman discussed the attitude toward "giving" in an article written in the context of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

One of the principal reasons officially advanced for terminating grant aid is that giving creates hostility rather than friendship toward the giver. This is nonsense. Some people make enemies in giving, others make friends; it all depends upon how it is done. It is true no one enjoys receiving aid from another; but if the giver manages to make the receiver feel he is a partner whose growing strength is important to his own welfare, and if he does not expect maudlin manifestations of gratitude, both giving and receiving can be attended by increased self-respect and friendship.(6)

A nation building program is designed to create change. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, it will contain "strings". An attitude of giving that emphasizes the mutual interdependence of two or more nations and peoples will go a long way toward mitigating the "strings." Conversely, an attitude of giving that focuses on gratitude from the receiving nation will be counter to our true interests and objectives.

A primary rule of human nature is that people are prejudiced toward the familiar. The phenomenon applied to a nation building program creates two fundamental problems: first, the supporting country has a natural inclination to take over the planning, organizing and execution of the program while the receiving country's officials and people stand in the wings; and

second; what is good for, and works in the United States may not be right for the country in question.

Many U.S. sponsored nation building programs have created beneficial change---while the United States was involved in the program. When, for one reason or another, the U.S. sponsored program was curtailed or terminated beneficial change did not continue. It did not continue primarily because the host country's officials and people were not sufficiently brought into the program planning, organization and execution. Involvement in the planning and organizing phase of a project enhances commitment to the program's execution. Further, the valuable experience gained from planning, organizing and executing is necessary to carry the program through future stages. Host nation involvement at every level of a U.S. sponsored nation building effort is essential for continued growth.

Our natural inclination to want to build an underdeveloped nation in our own image must be controlled. Our infrastructure, governmental bureaucracy, industry, and agricultural systems have evolved because of our cultural beliefs, laws, geography, climate, and many other factors that are different from those in most countries in the Third World. To attempt to apply all aspects of our culture to fix their problems is to invite disaster. For example in the field of construction, U.S. standard practices are not always appropriate. Designs should be targeted at local requirements, materials, customs, climates, and

tastes and take into account the skills and sophistication of local craftsmen to the maximum extent possible. The engineer's challenge is to design projects using locally available materials, equipment and labor which are functional, safe and easily replicated.

The attitude of giving as discussed earlier is all important. Ideally, a program can be conducted in an atmosphere of mutual support and benefit. If the United States actively promotes the "good" it is doing in the country, internationally or domestically, it can be harmful to the program. Just as one does not boast of or call undue attention to his helping a neighbor, so should a nation help a fellow nation. One of our objectives in the country is to improve the legitimacy of the government. Giving the credit to the host nation will further this objective. The "hearts and minds" of the people will more likely be won over to both the host government and the United States. Internationally, American prestige will be advanced further, if other nations recognize our efforts and praise them. There is a strong temptation for senior government officials and politicians to publicly extol our goodness relative to a program, particularly, if they are involved in executing it. This is difficult, if not impossible, to control in our society but does bring our basic motives into question in the target country and internationally.

From the point of view of a developing nation, learning the English language has not only been important in their relationship with us, it has been necessary. Many U.S. diplomats and the majority of the U.S. military and business community do not speak a second language. The whole nation building process depends on communication. The developing country has problems enough to overcome without having to carry the full burden of assuring they can communicate with us. We should at least go halfway and learn their language. Both sets of players, knowing each others languages, would improve real communications, understanding, and would serve to facilitate the transfer of ideas, concepts, and general knowledge. The added emphasis placed upon on U.S. personnel to learn a foreign language would serve our long term interests well after a program is completed.

Nation building is a long-term endeavor. It requires commitment to a long-term, integrated plan and long-term investment. Congress, by nature tends to be reluctant to endorse long-term programs. U.S. foreign aid appropriations are addressed and voted on annually often resulting in a "feast or famine" situation for U.S. agencies administering aid type programs. Congress has also shown an increasing tendency over the years, particularly since the Vietnam War, to get more involved in the details of a country program by earmarking appropriations for specific purposes. This micro approach has a tendency to be inconsistent from year to year, and severely affects the scope of what can be done in a given country.

The objective of a nation building program is to stimulate positive change. Our system of appropriation does not support this. First, because aid money is appropriated annually, the planning focus is on one year programs with short term objectives. Second, the earmarking of funds often ties the administration's hands when it comes to executing a balanced, integrated program. Finally, promoting gradual, continuous growth is often impossible due to fluctuations in funding from one year to the next.

The problem of continuity will not be solved until Congress approves a long term program which incorporates a spending schedule. To protect Congressional prerogatives, this program could require some type of annual or biannual review against some prearranged set of standards of milestones. Until the approval and appropriation process is reformed, nation building will be a haphazard venture at best.(7) Informing a recipient country that "the roads were approved but we didn't get money for the bridges" or "the 1990 appropriations were not approved; we'll be back in 1991 if Congress approves next years money" is more damaging to U.S. interests than doing nothing at all.

The best laid plans may go astray if the execution is uncoordinated. Likewise, three or four different, individually well planned and executed programs, which are collectively uncoordinated, may or may not produce beneficial change. The

U.S. has many organizational players in the developmental assistance role. Unless the efforts of each of these entities is coordinated, the overall result of their efforts may not be in the U.S.'s best interest. An individual country program must be established and each agency's role clearly identified and understood by all of the players for a program to be executed efficiently and effectively. A country development team must be formally organized, by country, with clear roles and fixed responsibilities.

Much can be learned from past developmental assistance efforts. A careful analysis of successes and failures will reveal commonalities which tended to support success or failure. The most valuable lesson learned is that an individual program must be developed for each country. This chapter has identified common pitfalls associated with failed or "less successful than they could have been" programs. Several of them are rooted in attitude. Attitudes that deviate from our stated national values are self-defeating. Other pitfalls are related to management. Where conditions, practices and even laws defy sound management principles, the net result of a nation building program will assuredly be less than it could have been.

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CHAPTER 4

NATION BUILDING: OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES.

The objective of security assistance programs is to maintain cohesion and strength of our alliances and cooperative arrangements which are essential to power projection capabilities of U.S. forces; to enhance the ability of our security partners; and to promote regional stability.(1) Nation building as an instrument of national power can enhance our posture in attaining each of these goals, but has particular application and relevance in promoting stability in developing nations while providing developmental assistance.

Any analysis of the application of an instrument of national power as part of a national strategy must start with our national interests and objectives. As related to the Third World, our national interests stated in the President's January, 1988 National Security Strategy of the United States are:

- A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
- The growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.

- Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.(2)

His major stated objectives in support of the above interests which have relevance in the Third World are, specifically:

- To maintain the security of our nation and our allies.
- To respond to the challenges of the global economy.
- To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world.
- To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the Third World.
- To build effective and friendly relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of concern.(3)

More specifically, as related to nation building in the Third World his objectives are as follows:

- To ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and mineral resources by the United States and its allies and friends.
- To promote national independence and the growth of free institutions world wide.
- To encourage and support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and growth of free and humane social and political orders in the Third World.
- To neutralize the efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the world, and to weaken the links between the Soviets and their client states in the Third World.
- To aid in combating threats to the stability of friendly governments and institutions from ' urgencies, subversion, state-sponsored terrorism and t. a international trafficking of illicit drugs.

To strenghten U.S. influence throughout the world.(4)

In the Secretary of State's Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, dated March, 1988, the major goals for U.S. foreign aid

programs are to:

- Promote economic growth and development;.
- Relieve human suffering, especially from lack of food;
- Achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East;
- Strengthen democracy in Latin American and Caribbean nations; and
- Strengthen relationships with countries of significant security interest to the U.S.

U.S. development assistance also is designed to promote:

- Market based, private sector activities in pursuit of economic growth;
- A dialogue between the United States and those who receive aid to achieve more rational economic policies in developing countries;
- Institution building and training; and
- The transfer of science and technology.(5)

The above goals represent our objectives for the exercise of our economic element of power. All goals have a direct bearing on and application to Third World countries.

One approach to analyzing the application of an instrument of national power is to look at its potential advantages and disadvantages. To look at the advantages and disadvantages purely from a U.S. perspective, however, would not be a complete analysis. The program must also be analyzed from the perspective of the potential recipient country. There are two viewpoints which need to be addressed: the perspective of the government in power and the perspective of the people. They hopefully are the

same; but in many Third World countries, what the government perceives as an advantage or disadvantage is often not perceived the same way by the people and vice versa. In this chapter we will examine developmental assistance, specifically engineering/construction, from both the host country and the U.S. perspective and provide the principles that must be considered in a nation building program.

The Recipient Country Perspective

The principal benefit of a successful assistance program to recipient governments is the legitimacy to govern. The more people perceive their government as doing something to improve their well being, the more legitimate the government will be in the public eye. As a result of public confidence in the government, unrest, or the potential for unrest, will be minimized. This will further allow the government to focus on domestic growth rather than security. It then follows, that the host country government should be, in fact, as well as in perception involved to the maximum extent possible in the development program.

Before moving on to look at the people's perspective, one point needs to be made concerning the relationship between economic development and unrest, specifically armed revolution. Colonel Rod Paschall, in a 1986 article, made the point that "Armed revolutions are not the result of poverty, but the product

of those very few skilled revolutionaries who have been able to persuade, organize, lead, and survive a race against a government's security forces."(6) He further makes the point that poverty may be used by the revolutionary as an issue to support revolution, while at the same time, the government may use development as a part of its plan to counter the revolution. He cites that development alone will not put down a revolution and, in fact, is not an essential part of a counterinsurgency plan.(7)

The previously cited U.S. national humanitarian related policies and objectives are aimed at the recipient country's people. A successful, developmental assistance program will serve to make basic subsistence, clothing, and shelter easier to obtain. It must foster hope for a better life in the future. An effective program will create jobs and the opportunity that goes along with learning new skills and receiving a sustained income. A sustained program over the long term will improve the standard of living with collateral improvements in general health and life expectancy. The most important potential result of a successful program is the reforms that will move the country toward increased social justice and democracy.

The U.S. Perspective

A principal objective of the United States is to promote regional stability in the Third World. Developmental assistance tailored both to specific countries and regions has the potential

to bring about and sustain regional stability. Conversely, uncoordinated, conflicting developmental assistance conducted in neighboring countries may in fact contribute to regional instability. For this reason, it is important that U.S. assistance programs are balanced between addressing individual country needs and regional stability issues.


Construction in a country will produce change. To what degree construction projects serve as the catalyst for positive change is a function of how the program is planned and carried out. Properly designed, administered and executed, a developmental assistance program, involving construction, can serve to promote democratic growth, improve human rights and increase the standard of living, all objectives of the U.S. in the Third World. A well run program will improve the U.S. relationship with the host country, resulting in closer diplomatic ties and alliances, increase economic opportunities for U.S. business firms and provide more reliable access to critical natural elements which we must import. ie, strategic minerals.

Additionally, U.S. officials and citizens may have better access to and movement within the country. This may contribute to more timely and accurate regional intelligence. It may facilitate less restrictive use of the country's airspace and territorial waters. Should U.S. basing rights for forward deployed troops and supplies be necessary, the closer

relationship resulting from a developmental program may facilitate this arrangement. Specifically related to, but not limited to construction, a developmental assistance program would provide a valuable and meaningful training related mission for our Army's Engineer units. Potential troop strength reductions and unit draw downs may provide available manpower resources for a nation building program.

The program should be aimed at improving conditions for the people both directly through specific projects and indirectly through host government reform. Any program is a gamble, but the better the situation in a country is understood and the more the program is directed at humanitarian issues, the greater the potential for success. Examined from either a national security or an economic standpoint, the world is growing smaller. The U.S. relative share of military and economic power is declining in the world. Our national security and economic well-being depend on our relationships with the Third World countries. This relationship will become increasingly important if we are to continue to advance as a world power. It follows, then, that we should continue to assist the Third World to grow in a positive direction, a direction which supports our national goals. This can only come from involvement.

The general principles required for consideration before embarking upon a coherent nation building concept are as follows:



1. Delineate firm foreign policy strategy and prosecute visible commitment to the strategy. Our national interests must clearly be served before embarking on any nation building endeavors. The legislative and executive branches must be prepared to commit adequate resources to the project to see it to completion.

2. The host nation must have a legitimate government that provides democratic support to the populace. Failure of the government to prosecute a democratic form of government and protect the human rights of the populace would be grounds for withdrawal from the project.

3. A program approach vice a project approach. A program approach allows for congressional approval and commitment at the inception of the nation building program with a fixed scope and attainable goals. This type of approach allows for potential recipients to develop a large number of acceptable projects. This is desirable not only because of the favorable economic effects of the additional projects that may be enjoyed, but also it provides the recipient a master plan of projects needed for progress. This process documents the needs of a nation and makes allocation and distribution of funding more equitable.

4. Risk assessment must be made prior to embarking on nation building endeavors. Early in the process assessment of the potential for success of the host nation's government must be conducted. One of the objectives of nation building should be to stabilize the government before social unrest can achieve a hostile revolt or revolution. Ideally, assistance and aid should be administered as a preventive measure at the lowest end of the low intensity conflict spectrum.

5. Continuity is one of the most important factors in generating a viable nation building program. Continuity in funding and support from the design effort through project completion is essential and demonstrates a resolve and commitment to the Third World. The development of a long range country plan provides the host nation with a map for progress and provides us

some control over the rate of development within a country.

6. A unity of effort in support of the nation building program must be achieved between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

7. For nation building or developmental assistance to be feasible, we must have diplomatic relations with and access to the country. Each country and region must be addressed as a separate entity.

In general, however, adherence to the following specific principles provide the potential for success. Developmental assistance has a better chance of initial and sustained support if:

1. The recipient government has a good human rights record.

2. The program has developmental/humanitarian stated goals versus security assistance goals.

3. The program concept is generally agreed upon and it is modest in scope.

4. The country is not engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

5. The country is substantially literate.

6. The country has a substantial social justice system.

7. The country has a reliable government, military, and


public administration (free of corruption).

8. There is clear agreement and understanding between the United States and the host country, and within the country of what developmental assistance involves.

9. The country has significant natural resources.

10. The country's culture supports economic growth and,

11. The country's elite are willing to be a part of changing the "status quo".



No program or country can meet all of the above principles for success. The program must address these principles in its scope. In the long run, humanitarian/developmental assistance must be based on a program that provides change and growth against a timely and logical progression.

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CHAPTER 5

NATION BUILDING: THE CHALLENGES.

Thus far this paper has focused on the different aspects of nation building as they have existed or currently exist. The remainder of this paper will put forward a concept for nation building in the future. It will summarize the hard questions that must be addressed in the future if the concept is to take form and be implemented.

Construction, one of the key elements of nation building, has the potential to break into the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment evident in so many Third World nations. Construction is a catalyst for growth and provides jobs and training while improving the nations quality of life. Planning for construction can serve as the forum for improving the effectiveness of host governmental agencies and can act as the catalyst for social and economic reform. Construction promotes the growth of small and large business endeavors in the supply and transportation of materials and products. The question then, is not whether construction or nation building will promote growth, but rather how do we plan, resource, and conduct a nation

building program with construction as its centerpiece?

In formulating a set of objectives and an organizational structure to conduct a nation building effort, it is useful to review some of the difficult challenges that must be confronted. The final solution to many of these challenges can only be derived through additional study and staffing. The common characteristic of each challenge is that there is no universal solution that can be applied to all situations.

CHALLENGE 1. With the current deficit and domestic problems such as the homeless, the hungry, the environment and the education system, how will the Congress be able to afford a program of nation building? Congress and the American public must be convinced of the benefits of such a program. Developmental assistance is one of the few ways we can impact and stabilize the Third World. The last administration that was successful in creating public support for foreign aid programs was the Kennedy administration.

CHALLENGE 2. How do you get multi-year funding commitment for country programs? This is an issue that President Bush recently identified to Congress. To date, Congress has been reluctant to fund multi-year programs. An obvious exception has been their authorization and appropriation of construction project dollars. Similarly, the Congress may find long term nation building programs, with clear cut goals and objectives

more acceptable for multi-year appropriations than a project approach. Appropriations could be made each year after the Congress has had the opportunity to review the progress of the programs.

CHALLENGE 3. What countries do we select as recipient nations. This decision must be made at the highest level of the executive branch and should reflect the consensus of the National Security Council with the inherent representation of the State Department and the Department of Defense. Assistance must be restricted to those countries that uphold our human rights beliefs and have a democratic form of government.

CHALLENGE 4. Can the U.S. be supportive of a host nation's government? An indisputable fact is that in a nation building endeavor the U.S. forms a partnership with the host government. If the government is predominately democratic and honors the human rights of its constituency then nation building may be a viable option. A commitment to a nation building program is an endorsement of the host nation's form and style of government.

CHALLENGE 5. How much help is enough? There are two aspects of this question: how much can we afford and what is required to affect positive, desirable growth in the host nation. Several writers have attempted to define the optimum amount in terms of a nation's "absorption factor" usually stated in terms of the nation's GNP. The theory, in short, is that there is a

saturation point above which additional economic activity creates destructive long term economic growth.

CHALLENGE 6. How do we integrate construction planning with the host nation programs and other U.S. programs? First, we must evaluate the issue in terms of our regional interests and strategy. Second, we must consider the organizational aspects of the program. The integration and coordination of all U.S. sponsored programs in a country is an organizational issue.

CHALLENGE 7. What do we build first? The answer to this question is situation or nation dependent. From a functional standpoint is it more advantageous to concentrate on agricultural or industrial growth? Is it more advantageous to start at the micro or macro level? For example do you build farm to market roads or do you concentrate on a national road system?

CHALLENGE 8. Form of assistance? Money? Troops? Advisors? Contractors? The solution to this challenge is highly nation dependent. Money shows commitment, limits direct control, and limits direct involvement. Troop deployments demonstrate a greater degree of commitment, increases the level of control, but involves stationing military units in foreign countries. The use of advisors, military or civilian, is a middle of the road solution. The use of contractors raises a completely different set of challenges and will be examined in the next challenge.

CHALLENGE 9. If contractors are used: U.S. or host nation? U.S. contract or host nation contract? Both parts of this question are dependent upon the host nation. Utilization of host nation contractors, to the extent they may exist, is beneficial because it stimulates economic growth. Conversely, utilizing U.S. contractors may introduce new methods and technologies that will aid long term growth and development of the host nation. The best solution might be a mix of both U.S. and indigenous contractors. Depending on host nation capabilities, it will probably be best to start contractual endeavors through a U.S. military contracting agency. As the host nation develops its skills in contract administration, more and more of this function could be turned over. Likewise, as the government develops the system and expertise to manage the actual construction, it would assume more of the responsibility, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would have developed the host nation's capability to manage construction.

CHALLENGE 10. How do we involve the people? The populace of the country must be totally involved in every aspect of the program. We must insist that the host nation insure the total involvement of the populace in every phase and level of the program.

CHALLENGE 11. How do we improve the host country government? Again, this is host nation dependent and may vary widely from one nation to the next. One common trait is that,

maximum participation by the host nation is essential to further growth. We want successful completion of the project while developing host nation capabilities that are self sustaining and offer positive growth potential to the host.

CHALLENGE 12. Who is in charge (U.S. Perspective)?

Again, this is an organizational issue.

CHALLENGE 13. Who does what (U.S. Perspective)? This is an organizational issue which has been the grounds for "turf battles" when not properly defined. It is a vital issue and must be clearly and carefully established prior to the start of any nation building program.

CHALLENGE 14. How and when does the U.S. terminate a nation building program before its completion? There are two conditions under which the United States would terminate a program prior to completion. The first, if we want to cut our losses in a hopeless, unsupportable situation. The second situation would be to turn over future development to the host nation. Our recent departure from Iran is an example of the first situation. Of necessity, this type of withdrawal is characterized by expeditiously departing without a turnover or handoff of functions. An example of a successful program conclusion and turnover can be seen in Saudi Arabia where the government has assumed full responsibility for their own construction program. The United States should be prepared to

terminate nation building operations in nations based upon the attainment of the original goals or when a situation becomes hopelessly unattainable because of political changes in the host nation.

CHALLENGE 15. How do we know if a program is successful? What is the definition of success? This is an area of considerable debate simply because different people look at different results and even measure the same results against different parameters. One group may look at the first order results and proclaim success while another group may proclaim failure based on the second, third or fourth order results. The focus the U.S. should take to measure success or failure is to measure results against our national interests and objectives in the framework of our national values. Each country program should contain objectives and milestones covering all important aspects of a program to which both the host nation and the United States agree. The process of formulating and subsequent commitment to objectives and milestones by the host nation represents the most important aspect of the "success measurement" process.


The preceding challenges do not represent the total number of questions and challenges that must be answered. Nation building is a controversial undertaking that must be viewed and evaluated as a competitive strategy in our quest to promote peace and stability for a higher world order.

CHAPTER 6

NATION BUILDING: A CONCEPT.

The vital interests and security considerations of the United States in the Third World are affected by a combination of economic, political, and military factors in a variety of global settings. Our foreign policy and security strategy must adapt to the varying demands of each of these areas. Developing countries within each geographic area take on peculiarities based upon the level of development, the legitimacy of the government, varying degrees of growth potential, and the desire of the population for positive change. To define one standard approach for all developing countries is impossible. The amount and type of nation building required in a particular region or country is best determined from the bottom up. In other words, the people best suited to define a program that supports our foreign policy in a developing country are the people on the ground. The level of success in conducting a nation building program is in direct correlation to our ability to provide timely and meaningful assistance to the host nation. Our overall objective in nation building is to provide assistance to Third World countries that helps them help themselves. The only personnel capable of

defining how much is a enough, when assistance should be provided, and where resources should be committed are the U.S. personnel, on the ground, in the nation in question. From these requirements, regional priorities are established and forwarded to the national level of our government for the formulation of a national priority list that best fulfills our national strategy within funding constraints. Project funding could then be allocated to best influence the donor's and the recipients goals and objectives.




As previously discussed, the best way to bridge this organizational gap may be through the Low Intensity Conflict

Board of the National Security Council. Concurrently, the in country effort needs to be centralized and the responsibility for defining projects and executing nation building should be organizationally fixed with one agency or individual. The following organizational chart prescribes an organization that facilitates nation building and provides the required organizational interface at the country, region, and national level.

The proposed nation building organization is designed specifically to integrate all the players under the Ambassador and Regional CINC into a unified team. The mission of this team is to work with the host nation at the lowest practical level to determine the requirements of the host nation and develop the best solution. This system organizationally fixes responsibilities and relationships at the country team level. The country development chief is responsible to the Executive Committee comprised of the host nation senior executive, the ambassador, and the regional CINC. This committee would establish a prioritized list for the country and forward it to the Department of State and the Department of Defense. These departments would each prioritize the projects utilizing their regional experts and attempt to achieve consensus at the National Security Council level. The NSC would be responsible for presenting one program per country, with prioritized project list to the President for approval and forwarding to the Congress for funding. The organization requires the participation and cooperation of the host nation, the Department of State, and the

PROPOSED
NATION BUILDING ORGANIZATION



Department of Defense. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering support and advice to the NCS and becomes an integral member of the Country Development Team. The role of the Army Corps of Engineers will be described in more detail later in this chapter.

Following program approval and funding the organization would monitor the execution of the program and insure the desired goals are attained. The Executive Committee would meet periodically to review projects under construction and to provide

general guidance and direction to the development chief. The country development chief would manage the total country development effort under the direct guidance of the ambassador and general guidance of the executive committee.

The Country Combined Staff would be composed of functional and regional specialists from the host country and U.S. agencies. Their principle functions would be to develop potential projects, coordinate ongoing projects and monitor the execution of the country plan.

The participation of the host nation is key and essential to the success of any nation building program. The degree and level of participation is not dependent upon the educational and intellectual capacity of the host nation's government. If deficiencies exist in the ability of the host nation to develop plans and programs, the Country Development Team must be prepared to assist, but cannot become so involved that they stifle initiative within the host nation. As projects and programs mature the level and degree of involvement must also increase. Therefore, an inherent part of any nation building project is the education and training of host nation capabilities.

The U.S. must insist on a host nation code of ethics for all government officials as a condition to any assistance program. The control of corruption in all nation building projects must be absolute and special care must be taken to

insure all dealings in support of these efforts are of the highest integrity and propriety.

Based upon the degree and level of development in any given country each program will have to be specifically tailored or modified to start at the appropriate level of host nation participation and progress as the skills and level of training improve. Education must be integrated into each project.

Technological exchanges are important and for the most part relatively inexpensive. Caution should be exercised to insure that the introduction of technological advances are progressive and that the populace of the host nation is able to utilize and maintain the technological advances. Introduced technology will never be fully sustained until it is infused into the host nation's schools and universities.

Nation building as a concept requires reform within our government. It also requires the commitment of resources and commitment to a supportable foreign assistance strategy. The strategic crux of the matter is to select the time, place, and manner of involvement. We must evaluate and assess our involvement continuously throughout the life of the project against measurable objectives and goals. Once committed to an assistance project we must be prepared to support that project to completion unless the host nation political infrastructure changes significantly. Nation building provides us the

opportunity to become selectively involved in the advancement of developing nations. It is a program that gives us an chance to provide positive incentives to the advancement of democracy and human rights while stabilizing potential areas of conflict. In the arena of global security nation building is an affordable concept of preventing armed conflict in the Third World.

The Corps of Engineers contribution to the nation building process is significant. Historically, the Corps has participated in these types of endeavors on numerous occasions with great success. The most recent example is the enormous contribution made in the middle east with the extensive construction that took place in Saudi Arabia. The benefits derived by the U.S. in this effort may not be fully realized for years to come, but the net result was the stabilization of the country and an unprecedented alignment with the West in general, and the United States in particular. Ironically, the nation building that was conducted in Saudi Arabia was done under the auspices of foreign military sales, at no expense to the U.S. taxpayer. The Corps of Engineers established a separate division to handle the increased workload. The program initially focused on providing the Saudi's with quality construction of numerous facilities of their choice. As the program matured, more and more of the responsibility was given to them. Eventually, their abilities and expertise developed to the point that they could and did assume full responsibility for the most sophisticated construction projects. Given the oil revenues that were being realized by the Saudi's at

the time and our desire to foster viable relationships in the Persian Gulf this program provided intangible benefits that will be with us for years to come.

The role of the Corps of Engineers in security assistance has yet to be fully exploited. Currently, the Mobile District is involved in the support of the Southern Command in Central America. This role and mission should be resourced and adopted by other districts in support of the other regions of the world that have developing nations that might qualify for nation building assistance. In the past, the commitment to civil and military engineering projects has been sufficiently intense to preclude or greatly constrain the Corps of Engineer's ability to support nation building activities. Anticipating a reduction in the funding levels for domestic projects, the Corps now has the opportunity to adjust its mission to accommodate the security assistance role while simultaneously preparing for its wartime mission in a peaceful environment. This rare opportunity provides the Corps of Engineers and the United States Army a training program of immense benefit to our Nation.

As previously mentioned, the engineering effort for the world has been distributed among the services by mutual agreement to preclude redundancy and duplication of effort. The U.S. military engineering capability is ideally suited for providing construction or nation building support to the regional CINC's and with minimal resourcing the country development teams

previously proposed. The capabilities of the Corps to design, build, and train the Third World countries in the construction industry is without parallel. The fruits of this expertise must be employed to further our vital interest in the developing nations of the Third World.

Placing a USACE representative on the Country Development Team at each embassy will open many avenues of assistance that have not been previously explored. Additionally, USACE must occupy a position on the Low Intensity Conflict Board at the National Security Council level to help establish coherent programs that fulfill our national security goals and objectives.

The role of the Corps of Engineers districts in nation building is envisioned as follows:

1. Each district would be assigned an area of responsibility to overwatch and support. The district would be responsible for supporting the regional CINC's in general and the Ambassador/Country Development Team Chief in particular.

2. Each district would work closely with the country development team to design projects that will further the progress of the host nation. Personnel within the district will be required to develop expertise on the assigned geographic area. A knowledge of the cultural aspects of the area would greatly enhance the ability of these experts to interact with the host

nation.

3. Particular emphasis must be given to the support relationship afforded the regional CINC's and the Ambassadors by the engineer districts. The district assigned a particular area must be prepared to design and manage construction of facilities while training the indigenous work force of the host nation.

4. The design of projects is an important function that can best be fulfilled by the engineer districts. The district assigned the responsibility for a particular geographical area would be tasked to provide procurement , contract administration and quality control during the actual construction of the project. This may require the establishment of in country resident or area offices as appropriate.

5. Engineer districts would assume the responsibility for the training of indigenous personnel in the construction trades and in the area of construction management. Districts must be prepared to conduct in-country training as well as bringing indigenous professionals to the United States to understudy our system of construction management. The training of indigenous personnel must be paramount for the successful conclusion of a nation building effort to be realized. Training should be an integral part of all construction and design contracts.

6. Unique engineer challenges must be fully evaluated by the use of the existing engineer laboratories. Problems and challenges solved through the use of laboratory studies have the potential of paying large benefits in the future if we are ever required to deploy to a like region.

7. Technological exchange can provide developing nations with advantages that can accelerate their growth while materially enhancing the quality of life of the populace. The districts assigned responsibility for a particular region must be prepared to further the technological growth of the developing nations of their region. Additionally, they must know their respective area in sufficient depth to be able to judge how much technological change the culture can withstand. In short, the districts designated with the responsibility for a region must have the resources available to allow them frequent visits to the region to correctly assess the capabilities of the host nation.

The deployment of active duty engineer battalions to Third World countries in support of a nation building endeavor may be desirable. U.S. Army combat engineer battalions (heavy) have the capability to do both horizontal and vertical construction in remote underdeveloped regions with design and logistical support. The district assigned responsibility for the region can provide both design and technical assistance to the battalion. Additionally, the district can assume responsibility for procurement and delivery of construction materials and

specialized class IX repair parts.

Using active duty engineer troop construction units for nation building will provide a valuable training opportunity for maintaining the battalion's wartime readiness. By utilizing CONUS-based units as the rotational base for personnel, within a few years, the training readiness of the personnel and units can be significantly enhanced throughout the Army. Additionally, this mission could serve as the test bed for the advancement of construction techniques and emerging doctrine in the area of a CONUS-based district supporting a foreign based engineer unit.

The role of the Corps of Engineers in the nation building process is a critical one. The support of the regional CINC's is not an unusual role for the Corps, however, a formalized mission to support individual ambassadors in the various developing countries of the world opens some unique opportunities which the Corps can meet while furthering our strategy to contain the expansion of communism by advancing the growth of democracy. The Corps of Engineers is ideally suited to enhance stability in the Third World and advance the concept of helping others by teaching them to help themselves.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Developmental assistance in the form of nation building can provide us with two distinct benefits in support of a national strategy that is less threat driven. First, it can assist us in stabilizing developing democracies and forge the bonds of alliances and coalitions. Second, it provides the U.S. Army, in general, and the Corps of Engineers, in particular, with a training opportunity to prepare for war in time of peace.

Historically, nation building is not a new concept, but since our involvement in Vietnam, this type of foreign assistance has been very limited. The preponderance of literature researched for this paper was written in the late 50's and early 60's. Although much of this information is dated, we have attempted to capture many of the lessons learned, conditions required for success and pitfalls of previous programs.

In discussing the challenges, it should be very clear that the implementation and sustainment of any nation building program requires political support to provide the means. The chapters

concerning the concept and the engineer contribution specifically deal with the ways to achieve a global environment where peaceful democratic order can flourish, the end.

As the research for this paper progressed, it became obvious that nation building is most economical and beneficial when applied in a conflict free environment. In other words, more progress can be realized in developing nations that are not engaged in internal unrest or conflict. As a nation moves into the low intensity conflict spectrum, less progress is achieved for the same level of investment. So, it follows that the most valued application of a nation building program would be in developing countries that have a government capable of representing the people.

Strategic forces have the inherent character of being capable of projecting power as a manifestation of deterrence. In a nation building program, the U.S. Army can project our national power into the Third World to deter and contain communist expansion, while maintaining the combat readiness of our units and personnel involved.

Organizationally, we have provided a concept that focuses on the process of developing and executing a nation building program. While we have attempted to refrain from developing a "how to nation build" manual, the current process of obtaining foreign aid and assistance is a quagmire of multiple players with

varying agendas that does not enjoy a unity of effort. A strong, unified organization can go a long way in justifying and validating requirements and the application of resources against those requirements.

Finally, the authors provided a basis for additional study and research in establishing a nation building program as an instrument of our national security. The beneficiaries of such a program are the United States, the developing nations and ultimately the world.

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